Previous posts have described the record of Transport for London and the Greater London Authority under Mayors Livingstone and Johnson with regard to cycling. Whatever the verdict on this record is, there is one two-wheeler group that has done well in London since 2000 – motorcyclists. Motorcyclists have profited from virtually unhindered access to supposedly cycle-specific facilties such as Advanced Stop Lines and cycle gaps in road closures. Press attention is drawn to pedestrians killed in collisons with cyclists, but not the larger number in incidents involving motorcyclists. While cycling is persistently portrayed as hazardous, motorcycling – with far higher casualty rates – is not.

TfL’s pro-motorcycling agenda is shown up well in the saga of allowing motorcyclists into bus lanes.  While the details may tend to bore all but the most hardened transport professional, this episode tells us a lot about how some road user groups can get their way, irrespective of the evidence supposedly required to justify legal changes. Time and again we can see in the history “road safety” how a safety benefit is consumed as a performance benefit. In this case it is even dubious whether any safety benefit for the measure taken has ever existed: we simply move to the performance benefit (of motorcyclists having extra road space) while using “road safety” as a justification.

 Below Colin McKenzie summarises the latest stage in this story:

Transport for London recently published their report on the motorcycles in bus lanes trial, together with a press release to say that they will continue the trial, but with extra education and enforcement. What did the report say? Why the need for the education and enforcement?

First, a little explanation on statistics. Statistics are more reliable with bigger samples. The smaller the sample, the bigger a difference has to be to be real rather than random chance. The problem with trials of motorcycles in bus lanes is that up to now sample sizes for collisions have been too small for confident conclusions to be withdrawn. Statisticians do some arithmetic to work out the percentage chance that a difference is real rather than chance. A difference is generally accepted as real if there is a 95% or greater probability that it is. This is called a statistically significant difference.

This trial is the biggest UK trial yet of motorcycles in bus lanes, and produced two crucial statistically significant differences between the test and control sites. Control sites are similar bus lanes where motorcycles remained prohibited when they were allowed at the test sites. This minimises the effect of unknown factors on the results.

The report is mostly factual, though it does speculate from time to time. The press release puts a definite spin on the report’s findings to try to justify the decision to continue the trial.

The main points are:

On Motorcycles
There was a statistically significant increase in motorcycle collision rates at the test sites – far too big to be explained by increased numbers of motorcycles. At control sites there was a decrease in motorcycle collisions, which again cannot be explained by reduced numbers. Overall, the chance of the difference between the test and control sites being real is over 99%. The report, in attempting to explain this away, goes as far as to say that if there had been 4 more collisions at the control sites, the difference would not have been statistically significant. This is like saying there were no motorcyclist fatalities, but if there had been one there would have been some. The results are what they are.

There were reductions in motorcycle journey times, and increases in motorcycle speeds, with the average across all sites exceeding 30mph. This suggests motorcyclists are breaking the speed limit more. These figures are statistically significant too, because the sample size is big.

On Cycles
There was a good increase in cycling at both test and control sites of 10-15% between before and after surveys.
At test sites, there was a tripling of cycle collisions, big enough to be statistically significant even though numbers were low. At control sites, the increase in collisions was about the same as the increase in cycle traffic. Adjusting the tripling of cycle collisions at the test sites for the increase in cycling gives an increase in collisions per cyclist of 173% (versus a slight – insignificant – decrease at control sites). Numbers are low, but this difference is so big that it is statistically significant – the report estimates a 98% probablikty that it is real.

The increase in cycle collisions at test sites was not due to more collisions with motorcycles. This is hardly surprising – there was only one collision between a cycle and a motorcycle in the whole trial! But because of this lack of cycle/motorcycle collisions, the report claims that the increase in cycle collisions is not due to the trial. They suggest no other explanation.

This is simply unacceptable. The whole design of the experiment was to exclude other factors from the trial. Either the increase in cyclist collisions was due to allowing motorbikes into bus lanes, or the trial design is broken and all the results should be thrown away. They cannot have it both ways.

I can think of numerous ways in which the presence of motorcycles in bus lanes could increase cycle collisions. The most obvious is that cyclists are riding closer to the kerb (because of motorcycles passing fast and close), making them less visible to other road users.

At this point the press release departs from the facts completely, saying: “There was a fall in the cyclist collision rate across trial bus lanes and the control lanes, with a smaller decrease in the trial lanes”. The only way this statement can be construed as truthful is if it only refers to collisions between cycles and motorcycles. It completely ignores the overall increase in cycle collisions at trial sites, which alone should have been enough to get the trial stopped.

On Pedestrians
No statistically significant effect.

On ‘conflicts’
The research uses a definition of conflict which I fundamentally disagree with. Essentially it’s putting yourself in a road position where someone might have to brake to avoid you, with severity assessed according to how much braking actually happens. This means that overtaking a traffic queue safely on the outside is recorded as a conflict, even if nothing is coming the other way, because if there were traffic the other way it might have to brake.

To me, the most significant conflict in this trial is overtaking too fast and/or too close – there’s no point braking, but the cyclist is frightened and/or annoyed. This is not counted as a conflict in the report – they did not even count such incidents.

Conclusion.
The report clearly shows that allowing motorcycles into bus lanes is increasing collision rates for both cyclists and motorcyclists, and is encouraging motorcyclists to break the law more. On this basis, the only defensible decision is to stop the trial immediately, to minimise further casualties.

Instead, the Mayor has chosen to gloss over the casualty increases and continue the trial. The proposed education and enforcement is an obvious attempt to reduce casualties to a more acceptable level.

This trial proves that allowing motorcycles into bus lanes increases road danger, both for motorcyclists and cyclists. It should be stopped forthwith and no further trials to be conducted. By continuing the trial, TfL is failing in its duty of care to the public. Some Councils in London have opposed having motorcycles in bus lanes on their roads,  with others going along with the trial: the evidence points to them stopping motorcycles being allowed in bus lanes.

Colin McKenzie, June 2010

 See also http://www.lcc.org.uk/index.asp?PageID=1884

 Previous posts have dealt with the limited possibilities of the Cycle Super Highways and Bike Hire Schemes. Together these will cost up to £300 million until 2015, (although Barclays are committing an additional £25 million).

 Of other initiatives, the mass participation Skyrides aim to get 1 million more cyclists over a five year period – but that is for the 10 cities in which they take pace over 5 years, and with cycling once a month being the measure of a new cyclist. Translated into London statistics, that means Skyrides are aiming at about an extra 5,000 daily cyclists, or a 2% increase, over 5 years. However, despite a great deal of organisation associated with Skyrides, there has been no follow-up monitoring to assess whether participants increase their regular cycling to achieve even this very modest target. Skyrides are fun activities which are rewarding an desirable to support and take part in: but how much of a permamnent increase in cycling on a day-to-day basis do they lead to?

 Then in 2010 we had the Biking Boroughs project: giving about a month’s consultancy support to 12 Outer London Boroughs to help them develop strategies to increase and support cycling. But no commitment has to be made by these Boroughs to actually show a convincing programme of how the Mayor’s targets are to be met by them. Nor are there any specific funds made available to them by TfL.  Some Boroughs are making substantial efforts to use this project  the basis for a real commitment to supporting cycling. But even for these ones are they – particularly without earmarked financial support –  likely to be “set to become havens for cycling” (TfL press release 13/01/2010)

This brings us to a central point:

 Where’s the money?

 As the Evening Standard put it “The Mayor’s 10-point plan to promote cycling…has much to recommend it. It shows too that is possible to improve our quality of life without spending large sums of money. There’s a lesson there for Whitehall.” http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard/article-23833651-now-the-real-work-begins-on-the-deficit.do

But the point is that you DO need to spend SOME real money on cycling to get to Boris’ targets.  (We have about 2% of trips by bike, and are supposed to get to 5% by 2026 – an increase of 150%.)

And he isn’t spending anything like enough. About £100 – 140 million on the bike hire scheme which (if successful) will increase cycling by 10% in London. Then about £150 million on the contentious Cycle Superhighways on less than 2% of London’s roads over five years (if the money isn’t cut, which it might well be).

According to TfL (Mayor’s Question Time May 2 010), spend on cycling is:

SPEND (£m)                       2008/09         2009/10                 2010/11 
               
Cycle Hire                              1                      17                              67 
Cycle Superhighways                                     5                              32 
Other Cycling spend            19                    19                             17 
               
Total Cycling                      20                    41                             116
               
Additional LIP Schemes       1                      24                             16 

 In other words, apart from high-profile flagship schemes with minimal benefits, very little is earmarked for cycling. It also seems to have been forgotten that Mayor Johnson’s major contribution to funding was to eliminate ring fenced spending on cycling. In the name of giving the boroughs freedom, they are now in a position to not spend money on supporting cycling, and can indeed create more hostile environments for cycling.

 This doesn’t exonerate the Livingstone regime: under him Boroughs’ cycle training budgets did not have to be to national Standards, for example. Imaginative projects would not be eligible to receive TfL funding. But very few Boroughs are trying to address issues such as home cycle parking or schemes to directly support cyclists apart from just basic cycle training: those that do will have to rely on very limited funding from the overall Local Implementation Plan (LIP) budget.

Isn’t this necessary with an austerity regime?

 Of course, it would be wrong to refuse the benefits of schemes such as the “Catch up with the Bicycle” poster campaign or (at last!) a projected anti-cycle theft campaign. But the fact remains that there is only limited and indirect funding for measures which stand a chance of reaching the Mayor’s target of 5% modal share of trips by bicycle.

It can be argued that something is better than nothing (it isn’t) and that we all have to expect reductions in funding. What this forgets is the issue of how much other modes of transport get by comparison.

The costs of other modes…

 RDRF would argue that private motoring has net costs to society and the environment even after all the various forms of motorist taxation are paid – and that there is a good case for requiring motorists to pay more, primarily through increased costs of fuel. But even without discussing car and road freight costs, we have to remember the subsidy to public transport.

While Boris has been cutting TfL’s expenditure, the fact is that subsidy for public transport is still far higher than spend on cycling. Roughly speaking, a typical bus passenger gets at least 80p per trip, or some £350 per commuting year, subsidy. Tube and rail passengers get more, and that’s without the extremely expensive Crossrail scheme.

By comparison, without the Bike Hire and CSH schemes, undefined TfL spend on cycling is supposedly about £20 million annually (it is unclear whether this includes Borough LIP spending on items such as schools cycle training)

…and what cycling deserves.

If cycling were to get more pr less the same amount of subsidy as bus transport, we could expect a ring fenced amount approaching £100 million per annum. (£350 x 275,000, the number of cyclists daily). That is for a mode which is generally far healthier and environmentally benign, as well as being more convenient in outer London. Cycling England gives a figure of a £10,000 (over a lifetime) as the benefit of an extra regular cyclist.

In addition, where highway infrastructure is the target for expenditure, one can argue that costs should be borne out of general highways budgets.

And even £100 million annually would be a small part of even a very reduced TfL annual budget in the billions of pounds.

 Meanwhile…

What we get is minimal undirected spend on anything apart from limited benefit flagship projects. The Mayor’s Cycling Revolution (www.tfl.gov.uk/cyclingrevolution) contains some anodyne aims (“Key partners working together to deliver cycling initiatives”). It contains some inadequate ones (“An increase in secure cycle-parking on streets, in workplaces, and at stations and schools “) – when about half the residences in London are flats or houses with inadequate space for cycle storage which is both secure and convenient.

But most noticeably it contains aims (“Investment in cycling maximised – from both the private and public sectors”) which dodge the issue of how support fro cycling is going to be properly directed and financed.

Not only is far more dedicated and targeted finance required – it is absolutely not a special requirement, but simply what is required for equitable treatment for cycling in a multi-modal approach which has a genuinely level playing field.

We would be asses to think otherwise.

++++++++++++++

I’ll be looking at the Mayor’s Cycle Safety Action Plan in a future post.

 That said, there is a plausible case for engineering the highway to reduce danger and inconvenience for cyclists, so there is a need for engineering at particular dangerous or inconvenient locations for cyclists like large gyratory systems. Or a network of signed cycle routes. Or both. In fact, it is arguable that without doing anything special “for cyclists”, all roads should have danger to cyclists engineered out of them as much as possible as a matter of course.

 So what has happened in London?

Various plans for cycle routes were promoted by the old Greater London Council, but the first “strategic network” was planned in the 1990s, backed by organisations representing the 33 London Boroughs, and called the “London Cycle Network” (LCN), and due to be on 25% of London’s roads at some 3000 kilometres.

 When Ken Livingstone became Mayor of the new Greater London Authority, Transport for London “reconceptualised” cycling and walking and the LCN was ended, to be replaced by the “London Cycle Network Plus” (LCN+) at a somewhat reduced 900 kilometres. Thus was born the first step in ushering a less extensive engineering scheme with a more impressive name. (Of course, it can be argued that having a “cycle route network” in the first place when all roads should be properly cyclable is the first step in this process.)

 LCN+ was never finished, with some 600 kilometres completed. Why? One central reason is that if there is to be a special “route for cyclists”, space will have to be allocated to it. Either there happens to be lots of spare road space around, or else it has to come from motorised traffic. Since there has been no large scale removal of motor traffic road space, “cycle routes” dependent on this do not get completed.

 In fact, Boris Johnson refused to complete the LCN+ on the grounds that doing so would be “unpopular” – that is to say, inconvenience motorists. (To be fair to Johnson, Livingstone had not pressed Boroughs to finish the LCN+).

 This brings us to the latest step in the progress to more grandiose terminology combined with a shorter network: the Cycling Super Highways (CSHs) – now down to 250 kms by 2015, if the money does not run out.

 The Cycling Super Highways

 Under the heading “Not so Super Highways”, our colleagues at the CTC address some of the issues:
“This video of riders on trial Cycle Superhighway 7 http://www.youtube.com/user/gaz545   in London shows that simply painting a thin blue line isn’t enough. While CTC supports the approach of creating continuous routes and making the busiest roads more cycle friendly, proposals on the cycle superhighways don’t go far enough to make conditions safer and more attractive for cycling. More must be done to reduce overall levels of motor traffic or reduce speeds on the routes. You can read further comments from CTC on the superhighways in this article from yesterday’s Guardian. http://email.ctc.org.uk/a/tBL7S6QB7uaWDB8Ily4NKS87ymQ/superhigh  . ”

 Despite the CSHs being supposedly committed towards less confident cyclists, criticisms have been pouring in that they do not offer sufficient safety. This is precisely because the old bug bear of “cycle route” engineering – namely taking road space from motorised traffic – has not been dealt with, particularly at gyratory systems and other junctions. At the same time, those practitioners who have focussed on training cyclists to ride in urban traffic without relying on “cycle routes” have claimed that the positioning advised by National Standards cycle training would not be in the marked out blue lanes for much of the CSHs’ length.

 Mayor Johnson looks like getting criticism from all sides of the “cycle route” debate, with plenty of jokes about CHSs being little more than expensive blue paint. Then there is the issue of cost – possibly £150 million if all the CSHs are completed. But apart from these issues: do we seriously think that Boris’ targets are going to be significantly met by this kind of engineering on 2% of London’s roads?

  

 Following the unveiling of the first “Cycling Super Highway” (CSH) in London by Mayor Boris Johnson, the excellent Velorution website declared “Boris is an Ass” http://www.velorution.biz/2010/05/boris-is-an-ass/. . Well, reducing politics to personalities and epithets is not our style.

 Also, we would point out that:

• Mayor Johnson has done a great service to cycling by cycling daily in normal office clothes (see above): a good example to London commuters.
•  He says the right things about cycling: “Put simply, it’s the best way to get around our city, and arguably the single most important tool for making London the best big city in the world.” (Cycling Revolution in London, TfL,  May 2010)
• Any problems with officialdom’s treatment of cycling can often be traced back to other agencies and Transport for London/ Greater London Authority under Boris’ predecessor, Ken Livingstone.

Below we review what has been happening in London since Transport for London came into being. The issue is, when the Mayor, GLA and TfL tell us about their apparently wonderful plans for cycling, are we asses to believe them?

 So what’s been happening…?

London is apparently going through what is indeed a “cycling revolution”. Flows of cyclists in central London are obviously significantly higher than at the end of the twentieth century. Parts of Hackney resemble Copenhagen. But what exactly has been happening – and why?

The modal share of bicycle trips throughout London* increased by 60% from 2000 to the 2005/08 average. By now (2010) one can say that the share has more or less doubled from 2000 – from 1% to 2%. The modal share of people cycling daily is greater (due to trip “chaining” by motorists and other factors) – up to about 2.8%. Essentially the visible significant increase in central London and a few other locations is balanced out by very low amounts of cycling in Outer London.

More important, the modal share is very low compared not just to towns and cities in Northern Europe (Germany, Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Sweden) and elsewhere in Europe (Ferrara, La Rochelle, Graz), but cities in England (Hull, Oxford, York, Cambridge, Bristol). The National Cycling Strategy produced in the 1990s aimed for a quadrupling of levels of cycling throughout England and Wales by 2012, which would have meant at least twice as many people cycling in London as there are now over the next two years.

So much for a “revolution”. But it gets worse: why has the increase taken place? Officially, it is because of the efforts of Transport for London and the London Boroughs (mainly funded by TfL). But there is a more likely reason for at least a large proportion of the increase.

It is one which occurs in road safety and elsewhere where professionals claim credit for changes. Known as “regression-to-mean”, it refers to a change which was due to happen anyway. With cycling modal share, we can point to a typical “underlying average” in northern European cities, including those which have not supported cycling, of some 5%. What has happened in London can at least largely be explained by a spontaneous return to this average.

Of course, some interventions have had some benefits, and the increase in cycling can be traced back to the concern around higher costs of running cars around the introduction of the congestion charge. Nevertheless, a large part of the increase in cycling can be seen as spontaneous and not due to official agencies like TfL and London’s Boroughs.

…and what’s supposed to be happening?

In order to meet the target now held by Mayor Johnson (and set by his predecessor) of 5% of journeys by 2026, the following main strategies have been pursued:

1. The central London Bike Hire scheme
2. Cycling Super Highways
3. Biking Boroughs

In addition, cycling is supposed to be supported by the Boroughs through their Local Implementation Plans (LIPs); there are the mass participation Skyrides; an initiative on cycle theft, a Cycle Safety Action Plan and general publicity.

So let’s look at the Bike Hire scheme: despite concerns about the (lack of) engineering of roads in central London, we think it looks good. But it aims for 40,000 daily trips, or an increase of less than 10% in the current London total. With success, a spread of the scheme and encouragement to cycle elsewhere, it might generate a 10% increase in cycling – when the Mayor aims for a 150% increase over the next fifteen years.

We would be asses to believe that this will fundamentally alter the modal share of cycling in London, but lets take a look at the other initiatives in the next post…

 But really, it IS a very moderate suggestion.

 So, let’s look at the price of fuel for motoring. Apparently it has been rising dramatically, “hammering” the UK motorist. For example, in early April the Guardian (“This week the AA warned that the average cost of a litre of petrol is on course for a record high of 120p”) published – courtesy of the press releases from motoring organisations – the apparent massive rise in the cost of petrol as follows: 

 So that’s a pretty dramatic increase in costs for drivers, isn’t it? No, actually it isn’t.

 Let’s look at this in terms of what are often referred to as the “real” costs.

 Firstly, we look at a price in terms of inflation. Using one of the recognised indicators, the Retail Price Index (gained from the Daily Mail, just to show how unbiased I am), the picture is somewhat different: 

 Still an increase, but not so dramatic.

 Secondly, let’s look at another indicator: Average income using the Average Earnings Index (figures go back to 1963):

 Here the change from 1960 until now is actually downwards for all but two of these years – not much up from 2000, with the only significant increase some 35% up from 1990.

 But even this is an underestimate for – wait for it – just how cheap petrol is compared to its cost previously. This brings us to the third way of trying to get a picture of that elusive price – the “real” price.

 Let’s go back to the Retail Price Index. This is one of the measures used to calculate inflation based on considering different items that people spend money on. What is generally absent from any discussion of calculating this type of index is the absence of house prices – the biggest single expenditure for most of us. Everybody knows that, against any measure of inflation, the cost of buying property has massively increased over the period from 1960. (I’m not considering rented accommodation, although I believe that to have also increased).

 o factoring in the cost of buying property, the picture is of – if anything –a decline, or at least stabilisation, in the cost of fuel in what most people would think of as real costs.

 But the picture is even more of an opposite when we consider the overall costs of motoring. These really have gone down – which is one of the main reasons (along with transport planning policies such as road building, which encouraged motoring) why there has been such a dramatic increase in the use of motor vehicles in general and cars in particular.

 This brings us to the fourth point to make in this argument: the cost of fuel is only part of the cost of burning fuel. Getting away from the hysteria of “rising fuel prices”, one of the most obvious features of the UK motoring scene  – apart from the massive increase in motoring – has been the appearance of fuel inefficient vehicles like SUVs running at c. 20 m.p.g., while at the same time far more fuel efficient vehicles have become available, For example the Honda Insight at 102 mpg (2.75 litres per 100 km) ; and the Civic  at 85 mpg , from 1993 http://www.brookes.ac.uk/eie/cleancar.htm .

 In other words, with more fuel efficient, even if the cost of a litre of petrol goes up, the cost per mile need not. In fact, the reason why more fuel efficient vehicles are not more extensively bought – and why very fuel inefficient ones are – is that fuel is so cheap. This article http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all~content=a739364852 examines how more fuel efficient vehicles have not been purchased in the UK, even when they have become available.

 But it gets even worse for people who claim that fuel is too expensive. The fifth point to make is that:

 The brutal truth is that the consumption of fuel can be dramatically reduced by driving properly. Consider the following recent description of how a typical driver can save some £800 per year by driving properly:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2010/may/01/save-800-pounds-year-petrol .

 And yes, there is even more: my sixth point is that driving a smaller, more fuel efficient car, and driving it more carefully, will massively reduce insurance costs. I haven’t even talked about reducing some car journeys…

 I think all the above leads us to a clear conclusion: fuel prices could increase quite dramatically without a very significant reduction in car ownership, and with only a minor reduction in motor traffic – although I would argue the latter in particular is desirable.

 Meanwhile, the main political parties have refused to consider increasing the cost of fuel. Only the Green Party has proposed an annual increase of some 8% (currently 10p a litre), which would lead to a doubling of fuel prices over the next two (4 year) parliaments. By that time even more fuel efficient cars will be available, cars will be due to be changed, more advice on driving properly will be available, etc. in other words, this move would not necessarily lead to a reduction in motor traffic and just it’s stabilisation. There is a strong case for steeper rises – along, of course, with other traffic reduction policies.

 One of the advantages of living on an island is that fuel prices can be raised effectively. One of the problems with British post-war transport policy is that petrol rationing was ended before it was in other places in northern Europe which have developed less car-dependent transport systems. There may well be issues around the poorer motorists (although most of those in poverty don’t drive); some rural communities car use, and other issues such as the desirability of carbon rationing instead.

 But for those interested in an equitable, sustainable and healthy transport policy, significant rises in the cost of fuel should be right on the agenda. Even before discussions about how much extra we all have to pay in times of austerity.

We point out that people adapt to perceptions of risk. We suggest that it is not necessarily a very good idea to assume that we should be living in a world with more and more cars which are to be used more. We think that danger should primarily be thought of in terms of the threat one poses to others, rather than the (supposed) danger presented to you. We try to speak English rather than “roadsafetyese”.

 It’s a bit like the old idea that “you can’t tell a man he’s not a good a driver”. We’re the kind of people who do.

 So, as we enter 2010 and all face the prospect of higher taxes and/or public service cuts, not to mention later retirement, reduced savings etc., let’s look at one particular taboo area which is even more relevant now than during the boom years. It’s also an idea which has a very special relevance for transport professionals.

 After all, this is the time when transport practitioners working in areas financed by central or local government are bracing ourselves for the dreaded cuts. How will we cope? Is there anything we can do to soften the blow(s)?

 I – and this is a personal opinion – think there is. It is for transport professionals to put forward the facts about the costs of motoring and present Government with an alternative to some of the inevitable cuts and taxation rises, not least in the area of properly resourcing sustainable transport. (I’m not interested in cuts in road building projects – a good area for public expenditure cuts if ever there was one).

 That alternative is one which has always been on the cards for sustainable transport advocates, which was minimally recognised with the fuel tax accelerator, but which has always been something of a taboo subject for politicians and professionals alike.  So here goes – steel yourselves:

 I think that motorists should pay a reasonable amount of money to drive their vehicles on the public highway.

 Phew! If you’re still breathing, let me explain what this would mean, why it is justified – and why it could, despite all the conventional wisdom, be a lot more widely accepted than most people think.

Why should motorists pay (a lot ) more?

 Take a look at the facts of motoring taxation presented by our friends in the moderate transport campaigning group Campaign for Better Transport http://www.bettertransport.org.uk/campaigns/climate_change/roads/facts/taxes#2 . These use the conventional indices employed in cost-benefit analysis and other forms of calculation used by car-centred transport researchers and show that, for example:

• The costs of motoring have fallen by 13% against the Retail Price Index (which doesn’t include, for example, the increased cost of housing) since1997 alone. This during a time of increased working hours, often diminishing pensions – before the credit crunch.
• Fuel costs are often far higher elsewhere in Europe
• Even according to conventional analyses, motorists do not pay the costs they incur. Even if you could put a cost on pollution, congestion, danger, destruction of local community, collisions, health of road users, etc – motorists do not pay anything like the official estimate of these costs.
• We pay far more in taxation elsewhere – why not on something which has so many negative impacts? Even those hostile to paying indirect taxation must be aware of the vast sums paid in local taxation, VAT, alcohol excise duty, stamp duty  etc.
• Reducing dependence on car usage can be helped by Smarter Travel and other initiatives – but apart from the fact that these are of limited benefit and need financing, increased car usage is associated with lower driving costs. Increasing driving costs is a great help – if not necessary – for a healthier, more sustainable transport system.

 Of course, there are some reasonable objections:

• What about the poorer drivers who might have to stop driving altogether? The poorest still don’t drive. And poorer drivers have problems of not being able to get on the housing ladder, having adequate health care, housing, pensions etc. Why should they be subsidised – for that is what it is – when other areas are more worthy of subsidy? If this is not a good enough answer, then there could be allowances for lower income drivers – if, as with income tax, wealthier drivers were to pay more.
• Wouldn’t it be more sensible to have carbon rationing? Maybe, but in the short term this is a good way of dealing with the relevant issues.
• Isn’t it just another way of raising taxes for the Government? Although it is a way of reducing the problems associated with increased car and other motor vehicle use – yes, it is a way of raising money. If you don’t want to pay any taxes, I suggest thinking about not paying off the deficit, not paying tax on alcohol, VAT rated goods, income tax etc.
•  What about people in remote rural areas, or in sectors where it really is difficult to reduce motoring or drive smaller vehicles? There may well be special cases fro exemptions. But often these are areas where the problem is precisely that we have made motoring so convenient that dependency was created in the first place: that kind of argument is often part of the problem. And as with the poorer drivers case, if there are exemptions, then those who don’t find it so difficult to reduce car usage should pay even more to make up for the exemptions. Besides, most motorists can reduce their car journeys to some extent – see http://www.bettertransport.org.uk/campaigns/climate_change/roads/facts

 So how much should motorists pay?

 Just to get a rough idea, how about the average driver paying what they were paying (in so-called “real” terms) in the early to mid-1990s? Hardly deep in the mists of time. Yet the costs of motoring have fallen by 13% against the Retail Price Index (which doesn’t include the increased cost of housing) since1997 alone. So a good ballpark figure would be a 15% increase in costs.

 …and how?

 A good way is to base costs on emissions (noxious and greenhouse gas) and size of vehicle (related to levels of road space taken up and danger to others).  Obviously there are great differences between the kinds of vehicle, the amount of mileage done, the amounts of insurance paid etc. But if this price were paid through increasing the price of petrol, we could envisage an average of some additional £600 – £750 per annum for a typical car – motoring organisations claim current costs of £4 -5,000 per car per year -  if we returned to the 1997 price. That would translate into a rise of petrol prices by 50 -100%.

 That would realise – allowing for shifts to less motoring and/or more fuel-efficient cars – some £10 billion per year extra. That’s if we only returned to the 1997 price “in real terms”.

 This is an extremely rough figure; it doesn’t include any cost rise in the haulage industry, allow for necessary exemptions (in agriculture, with taxis and public transport) etc., etc.  But it does show that a significant amount could be raised of an order – some £10 billion per year – which would make a difference in the current discussions on necessary cuts and higher taxes.  Of course it also shows that, despite the continuous claims that vast amounts of tax are paid by motorists, compared to annual borrowing figures of £180 billion, and the amounts raised by general taxation, the contribution of motorists is not that great.

So can we push this on to the transport policy agenda?

 Once the taboo of motorists paying has been raised, the prospect can become quite attractive. In fact, looked at in the context of the costs of motoring to society and the environment, this is more a question of motorists partly paying their way, rather than taxation. Healthy debate on the costs of motoring should help in reducing prejudice against non-motorised modes (such as that against cyclists “not paying a tax”). It can confront the myth of motorists “paying for the road” foreseen by Churchill as a danger nearly a century ago.

 The precise method: charges based on size of vehicle, types of congestion charge; fuel costs etc., is up for debate. The point is to reflect the damage done by motoring and to reduce the need for taxation and/or cuts in government spending.

 It offers a useful, if not necessary spur to more sustainable transport policy. It allows for at least some choice in a revenue-raising measure – as most motorists can drive more carefully, or less, or in a more fuel-efficient vehicle – compared to most forms of taxation. But most pertinent at the present time, it offers an alternative to transport (as well as other public sector) expenditure cuts which should concentrate the minds of transport professionals.

It could come down to a choice – cut your mileage and/or pay a bit more to drive and/or change your car – or lose your job. That choice might prompt some taboo-breaking thinking.

But I submit that the word “treacherous” employed to describe difficult conditions is misplaced – and looking at this (ab)use of language tells us a lot about travel on the road, and not just the safety of it. For us at RDRF, speaking English, rather than “road safetyese” is very important. “Treachery” in  the current discussion implies an immutable right to drive as far as is desired, when, how and for whatever reason – and that if the environment does not allow you to do that with convenience and safety, it has “betrayed” you.

For a superb discussion of how a hypermobile, car-based society views the weather conditions that are an inevitable fact of life, we suggest you read Simon Jenkins in the Guardian on http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/dec/22/blame-for-winter-travel-chaos 

Simon Jenkins has, in my view, made an admirable (but flawed) contribution to debate on transport and “road safety”. He is a fine exponent of the work of John Adams: the critique of “hypermobility”, risk compensation (particularly with regard to bicycle crash helmets and shared space), Jane Jacobs and others with a commitment to civilised urban space. The flaw is when he neglects to do – well, what we believe in doing, which is to emphasise the need to reduce danger at source. For us, the limitations of speed cameras are not a reason for not trying to reduce speed, but for more emphasis on the need to reduce speed and danger to road users, particularly those outside motor vehicles.

Looking at the adaptive behaviour of road users is something that can be done to highlight how “road safety” interventions have shifted danger on to the most benign road users. It can also, very positively, show how a “critical mass” of cyclists can lead to reduced cyclist casualty rates by forcing an adaptation in motorist behaviour, or how shared spaces can do the same thing for pedestrians. But stressing adaptive behviour can also be (mis)used to minimise the benfits of measures reducing danger at source, namely from motor traffic  – and we worrythat Simon Jenkins is tempted down that route.

Where he comes into his own is in articles like http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/dec/22/blame-for-winter-travel-chaos . Of course, as I cycle gingerly along icy streets, my first thoughts are how nice it would be if the ice wasn’t there. I will be even more inconvenienced when it comes to transporting the disabled and frail members of my family on journeys which I feel have become neccessary, and which can only be done by cars or taxis.

But I have cut out most of the kind of journeys made by motorised transport by the typical UK citizen (particularly by car)  for myself. And I try to help others do the same.

Have you?

“Men are always trying to protect me, I wonder what they are trying to protect me from…”. Mae West

A lot of colleagues think that it is helpful to refer to pedestrians (particularly children and elderly people) and cyclists as “vulnerable road users”. I disagree: seeing people who just happen to be outside metal boxes as being special easily morphs into seeing us AS A PROBLEM.  It is pften connected to what has been referred to as the “Fear of Cycling”. It misses out on the elephant in the room – or what the excellent Mkael Coville-Anderson of Copenahgenize.com refers to as “The Bull in the China Shop”.

In fact , it does what so much of “road safety” ideology does – it inverts reality into seeing cycling and walking as the DANGEROUS MODES.

So – what do you say when you are asked – or told – that cycling is “dangerous”?

1. It’s the transitive meaning we’re interested in. Or to put it more simply, WHO DOES WHAT TO WHOM. When you look at this way, cyclists (per mile, per journey or any other way you want) don’t kill or hurt others as much as the motorised do. Cyclists are on about a par with pedestrians for being legally responsible for hurting others. As for the near misses (”I have been nearly killed by a cyclist so many times”) the same applies – it’s the motorised, stupid.

So just tell your questioner that you do kill a few people every now and again, but only when they ask you stupid questions. And then you tell them to wear bright clothing and a helmet, and you always say: “Sorry Mate, I Didn’t See You” when you’ve knocked them down. ( I’m kidding. And do try to not knock over pedestrians).

2. Cycling isn’t that hazardous.  For a typical urban area in the UK, and particularly London, you have a very small chance of being hurt or killed.

3. The health benefits of regular cycling far outweigh the chances of being hurt or killed. You are more likely to die from not cycling than cycling.

None of which means that the chances of being hurt shouldn’t be reduced – quite the contrary. It means we should reduce danger at source. Yes, of course the so-called “vulnerable road users”, or to be better and more precise, the Non-Motorised Users should try to behave appropriately, but this will probably be most effective when it impacts on the behaviour of the motorised by creating a “critical mass” of NMUs who make the motorsied more aware of the presence of NMUs – the “Safety in Numbers” effect.

The point is that reducing your chances of being hrt or killed by another road user means looking at which forms of transport are dangerous – which brings us back to point Number 1.  It means talking about the “Dangerous Road Users” – those more dangerous to others, and not seeing those outside cars as some kind of problem.

Surely there is no need for detailed statistical discussion about this event, still less questioning what has become a – or the – major triumph for those officially charged with safety on the road?

But no. A recent debate has seen the proponents of compulsory bicycle helmet use drag the issue out again – and this time some revealing facts have been shown up. Some uncomfortable truths about the effects of the seat belt law in the UK  and the  “road safety” establishment  have critical relevance to everything that those of us working for safety of all road users should be aware of.

So, if you’re interested in real road safety, do read on…

It all started with a debate on whether mandatory wearing of cycle helmets by child cyclists would be desirable, featuring the main theorist or risk compensation, Emeritus Professor John Adams at the College of Emergency Medicine. His opponent,  Dr. Andrew Curran,  justified mandatory cycle helmet wearing on the basis of the supposedly unqualified success of mandatory seat belt wearing.

 Leaving aside the point that seat belts are undoubtedly effective after crashes in mitigating serious injury, whereas the evidence for cycle helmets after road crashes in mitigating serious injury is dubious, this comparison is extremely instructive. But against, rather than for, both seat belt and cycle helmet compulsion – particularly if you walk, cycle, or are simply interested in reducing danger at source anyway.

 It is also instructive to examine this comparison properly if you value scientific enquiry. Or if you think it wrong to endanger the more vulnerable (and less dangerous to others) road users in the name of safety. Or if you think it wrong to kill cyclists and pedestrians in the name of safety, even if the number killed is supposedly “not high enough” to count.

 I strongly suggest that you read all the contributions of Professor Adams in September and October of 2009. In particular, his letters to a leading figure in Britain’s “road safety” lobby, Rob Gifford of PACTS, which I suggest Mr. Gifford was unable to satisfactorily answer – but, of course, decide for yourselves. (The third letter may be difficult to follow all the way through for users of IE7, try Firefox, Opera or Safari)

 I intervened with two sets of comments to the second letter by Professor Adams:

http://john-adams.co.uk/2009/09/30/second-open-letter-to-executive-director-of-pacts/

reproduced below. They refer to matters which are central to safety on the road – here they are:

 on 30 Sep 2009 at 1:06 pm   Dr. Robert Davis

“The seat belt law experience is highly relevant today in respect to matters other than cycle helmets: however much eyes may roll at the prospect of statistical analysis of a law passed decades ago, this matter is highly pertinent.

Firstly, the obvious truth of adaptive behaviour or risk compensation is central to contemporary discussions of some very positive episodes: the good experience of safety with “shared streets” and the decline in casualty rates among London cyclists as just one example of “safety in numbers” with numbers of cyclists approaching “critical mass”.

Secondly, the obvious truth of adaptive behaviour or risk compensation indicates that the relentless idiot-proofing of the driver environment – whether of the vehicle or highway – has produced idiots in such a way that the “road safety” lobby is hardly well qualified to pontificate on matters of cyclist or pedestrian safety – of which cycle helmets is just one. No doubt this is a main reason for the denial of such effects from the “road safety” establishment.

Thirdly, the obvious truth of adaptive behaviour or risk compensation indicates that supposed progress in declining RTA fatalities and other casualties may have resulted from adaptive behaviour by the most benign and vulnerable road users, as opposed to “road safety” interventions, including migration from the road environment entirely. Again, this might explain some denial from practitioners of “road safety”.

Finally, the obvious truth of adaptive behaviour or risk compensation indicates that some changes in fatalities are due to changes described by the Smeed and Adams curves, and are independent of interventions claimed by “road safety” professionals.

All of this suggests that denial on their part is understandable, but not acceptable to those of us concerned with the safety of all road users and the truth.”

1. on 30 Sep 2009 at 1:10 pm   Dr. Robert Davis

“Can I make another comment which seems rather crucial?

You say:

“In your Significance article you are clear that the law has saved the lives of people in cars at the expense of vulnerable road users: “The picture shows a clear reduction in death and injury to car occupants, APPRECIABLY OFFSET BY EXTRA DEATHS AMONG PEDESTRIANS AND CYCLISTS.”(MY EMPHASIS – Rob Giffords words).

John, you then go on to give a (blackly) amusing analogy. One can put this in a less dramatic way: doctors – and doctors are among the main proponents of such types of intervention – are required by their ethical code (the Hippocratic Oath) to “First, do no harm”. You appear to admit that this is precisely what they have not done – that they have killed people in the most vulnerable, and least dangerous to others, road user groups in the name of “road safety”.

For this reason those of us who are supporting the most benign and healthy forms of transport are unlikely to trust PACTS, RoSPA and others supposedly concerned with safety on the road ,of which bicycle crash helmets are just one issue.

If Gifford values his reputation among those concerned with the safety of all road user groups and the genuinely scientific community, I suggest he reconsiders as John suggests.”

+++++++++++++

The Department for Transport has produced a crucial document:  “A Safer Way: Making Britain’s Roads the Safest in the World”  which will be the basis of future national “road safety” policy after 2010. Our response to the consultation document is here: the DfT have also kindly allowed us to post the document (with our comments inserted in the text) on our site here.

As this document is of such central importance, it is important to be aware of it. For us, there is one significant move in the right direction (the adoption of the “rate-based” target for cyclists and pedestrians); one or two other minor improvements; a few things we are more or less sympathetic too – and the rest is the same old, er, same old. (Who says we can’t be polite?). We are basically opposed to a fundamentally flawed approach to understanding what danger on the road is – and what to do about it – throughout “A Safer Way”, specifically, the continued:

* Failure to properly define “safe roads” (allowing, for example, more hazardous environments to be defined as “safer”).

* Denial of adaptive behaviour (risk compensation) by road users.

* Inability or refusal to differentiate between endangering or killing/hurting  others on the one hand, and being endangered or killed/hurt on the other.

* Failure to approach the standards of other relevant safety regimes and oppose rule and law breaking driver behaviour.

* Commitment towards unsustainable transport policy and car dependence.

In fact, it shows just how far away government is from grasping what road safety policy should be about, and why the RDRF is needed. So do have a read of it and our response.