At this point I confess experience – I briefly held the honour of being the “National Rights Officer” for BC’s precursor, the British Cycling Federation (BCF). This post didn’t last long. The BCF and now BC are basically not geared up for addressing transport policy and safety issues involving cyclists in the way that the CTC has been over the last decade or so, let alone the various urban cyclists groups.

Some old letter head...

 The current campaign is based on 800 self-selected BC members giving their views. (An interesting feature of all membership organisations is the way that policy is decided by members opinions being collected in various ways).

 And these views have a lot to do with what is required to reduce danger to cyclists: reducing speeds from 30 to 20 mph in urban areas; trying to get drivers to be aware of the right distance required for safe overtaking; removing lorry drivers “blind spots”; and not having cycle lanes that end suddenly.

 The BC Chief Executive is also correct to echo the idea of Safety in Numbers put forward by the CTC “…evidence suggests that the more people who cycle, the safer it becomes.”. This is a notion based on the adaptive behaviour of road users to perceived hazards, explored by the road safety academic Reuben Smeed decades ago, elaborated here , and here and studiously ignored by the road safety establishment ever since.

Where it gets dubious is when it comes to our old friend “mutual respect”. We are, so we are told, All in This Together. The BC Chief Executive, Ian Drake, says:

“It’s essential that we get away from this sense of ‘them and us’ between motorists and cyclists. Most people who ride a bike also drive a car which suggests there should already be some mutual understanding. Now more needs to be done to build on this and create culture in which all road users can better respect each other.

“And it’s important to stress that cyclists have as much of a role to play in this as motorists, by ensuring they adhere to the rules of the road with regards to things like stopping at red traffic lights and signalling correctly.”

Let’s be clear about this: I’m all for courtesy and being polite to one another. It’s nice to be nice. If we all do the Right Thing (whatever that might be) then nobody will be hurt or killed. It will all be just peachy. To mix the fruit metaphors, life on the roads would be a bowl of cherries.

The only problem with basing on a strategy on this “even-stevens” approach is that it is at best rubbish and at worst a recipe for continuing danger wrapped up with victim-blaming. It won’t work.

Why, when I think it’s a good idea to be nice to people, do I say this? It should be obvious, but after 90 years of the “road safety” lobby, we need to explain.

The brutal fact of the matter is that we have power a differential on the road. This involves some road users (basically the motorised ones) having massive potential lethality and some others (generally speaking, those walking and cycling) having a lot less. This is apart from the fact that the latter – referred to as “Vulnerable Road Users” because, like the vast majority of travellers in the world, they happen to be outside cars – are particularly vulnerable to the danger posed by the former.

This absolutely fundamental feature of safety on the road has been systematically glossed over by the “road safety” lobby throughout its existence. We should all just try to be nice to each other. The fact that some types of road user are inevitably going to pose a threat to others, and that these others are going suffer however well they try and behave – whereas the converse is not true – is just left out of the picture.

But it gets worse. Far worse.

For at the same time as it advocates everybody being nice to each other, this same lobby has insisted that motorists are so inherently likely to break the rules and regulations – that they are inherently unwilling to and/or incapable of doing so – that their danger must be accepted and accommodated. It must be colluded and connived with.

Basically this comes down to engineering the vehicle and highway environment to idiot-proof motoring in the full knowledge that doing so will produce the idiots and exacerbate their idiocy. The relatively non-dangerous are urged to obey rules while the far more dangerous to others (let’s call them Dangerous Road Users, or “DRUs”) are actually being accommodated in their rule breaking.

This is then accepted by those claiming to be interested in the safety of their members: note the way in which a cyclist disobeying  traffic signal is put on the same level as far more lethal behaviour by motorists.

Or take the support for BC’s campaign by the representative of an organisation which came into being to pass through legislation (compulsory front seat belt wearing) based on the assumption that motorists are inherently likely to crash their cars. And which has been shown to increase danger to cyclists and pedestrians, actually being associated with more cyclist and pedestrian deaths immediately after it was introduced.

(The following is quoted without comment by the normally sensible BikeBiz site  “The findings were also welcomed by Rob Gifford, Executive Director of the Parliamentary Advisory Council for Transport Safety, who said: “This is very consistent with what we know about how best to further improve road safety and I think that the overall theme that measures should promote mutual respect and understanding between road users is exactly right.” )

Exploring these background issues may seem irrelevant, but I believe it is absolutely necessary in order to work out what may, or may not, be achieved. Take the “I’m also a motorist” trope: “Most people who ride a bike also drive a car which suggests there should already be some mutual understanding.” This may be true for adult BC members, but not necessarily the rest of humanity, but let’s leave that for the moment – let’s look at people who use different modes of transport.

Motorists who ride bicycles may – and I repeat “may” – may be aware of some relevant problems for cyclists, such as overtaking too close, but that doesn’t mean they will become better drivers generally. Most of the problems created by motorists for other road users do not involve general bad intent towards others, and feature a general lack of ability or unwillingness to obey the regulations. Most motorists are pedestrians, but that does not mean they obey the regulations and laws whose infringement threatens pedestrians.  

In fact, it could make them more unlikely to support measures necessary for cyclist safety. Note that the measure to support 20 mph is qualified: “The reduction of urban speed limits from 30mph to 20mph would reduce the severity of injuries sustained in any accidents, although it was acknowledged that drivers might become agitated if they had to drive at that speed.”

So what will happen to this campaign? How exactly will it be pushed forward? I confess to having doubts about the best based of campaigns. And it is crucial that a campaign is based ona real understanding of – and willingness to confront – the power structures that underlie transport policy and safety on the road.

 I leave you with a new website which preaches a benign attitude by cyclists towards motorists – but, as its name implies, doing so from a position where cyclists claim a position of power and entitlement. This kind of claim is not evident in campaigns such as the one by BC.

House of Commons Transport Committee: Reply by Road Danger Reduction Forum to “Call for Evidence” into the Government’s “Strategic Framework for Road Safety”.

 30^th October 2011

SUMMARY OF MAIN POINTS:

• While there are fundamental flaws in the Government’s approach to safety on the road, nevertheless we can say that:
• The absence of traditional road safety targets being set is not necessarily a problem: however, there is a need for alternative targets to be set to reduce danger on the road, and they have not been.
• The decentralisation programme of the current government will impede any efforts to reduce danger on the road.
• The current legislative framework, combined with inadequate levels of traffic policing, is utterly insufficient to properly reduce danger ion the road, particularly towards cyclists and child pedestrians.
• The action plan will not be able to achieve reduction in the chances of cyclists and child pedestrians being hurt or killed on the road.

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

1.  Introduction: The Road Danger Reduction Forum (RDRF)   

1.1     The RDRF was formed in December 1993 after the “Is it Safe?” Conference organised by Leeds City Council, itself prompted by the publication earlier in the year of “Death on the Streets: Cars and the mythology of road safety” by Dr. Robert Davis. The RDRF exists for professionals working in and for local government as highway and traffic engineers, road safety officers and others supporting road danger reduction (RDR) as part of the sustainable transport policy agenda. It has 20 local authorities as members that have signed the Road Danger Reduction Charter.

1.2      We also try to form partnerships with organisations that support the RDR, or “real road safety” agenda, such as the national cyclists’ organisation CTC, the Environmental Travel Association, London Cycling Campaign, the national road crash victim’s charity RoadPeace, Slower Speeds Initiative, etc.

1.3      Road Danger Reduction (RDR) – the “real road safety” agenda: We believe in “Safe Roads for All”, and that much of traditional “road safety” has been part of the problem of danger on our roads. We highlight these problems as they appear in the text of“A Safer Way: Making Britain’s Roads the Safest in the World”, as shown on our website www.rdrf.org.ukMore detailed explanations of road danger reduction and the steps required to achieve it are elsewhere on www.rdrf.org.uk The principal feature of RDR is the commitment to reduce danger at source – the inappropriate use of motor vehicles.

1.4      As such, we have fundamental problems with the Government’s strategic framework for road safety which we are asked to comment on. These are detailed at http://rdrf.org.uk/2011/05/a-bad-day-for-safety-on-the-roads/ and  http://rdrf.org.uk/2011/05/what-else-is-wrong-with-the-strategic-framework-for-road-safety/. Nevertheless, there are some comments we believe we should make:

1. 2.   “Whether the Government is right not to set road safety targets and whether its outcomes framework is appropriate.”

2.1       There is substantial evidence, as evidenced in the Smeed curve, and discussed at length by us and authorities such as Professor John Adams, that road deaths per head of the population decline over time irrespective of the type of road safety intervention introduced by Government. We believe it likely that road deaths will decline with a likely decline in general levels of societal risk, which appears to be associated with a likely reduction or stagnation in economic activity.

2.2        It is also the case that many “road safety” interventions shift the burden of risk from the road users more dangerous to others (the motorised) on to the more vulnerable and benign modes (walking and cycling). It is therefore the case that reductions in overall road deaths can be at least partly due to a smaller share of the traffic mix by walking and particularly cycling.

2.3       As such, the absence of “road safety targets” by Government may not be a problem. Nevertheless, there are objectives which can be quantified which should be specified by Government as aims. These are:

2.4       (a)The targets referred to as “rate-based targets”, that is to say casualties (Killed and Serious Injuries – KSIs) expressed in relation to levels of exposure, e.g. casualties per journey or distance travelled. These should be the desired primary targets for reduction for cyclists, with more importance than the overall numbers of KSIs for cyclists nationally or in local areas. These can be used in areas where there are significant amounts of travel by bicycle and where there is therefore adequate data.

     (b) For pedestrians, where data on numbers of journeys is more difficult to secure, the target should be casualties per journey at specific sites.

     © Even where the “rate-based target” is used, this does not adequately refer to the danger to cyclists and pedestrians. It is possible to illustrate the rate-based targets by referring to the issue of legal fault: the long-term aim should be to reduce the rate of cyclist and pedestrian casualties where other road users are primarily legally at fault.

     (d) As a subsidiary target, it should be desirable to survey people as to whether levels of road danger are high enough to dissuade cycling and walking for them and their children.

2.5     Other targets which should be used are those relating to levels of dangerous behaviour, principally rule and law breaking behaviour by motorised road users, such as reductions in proportions of drivers and motorised riders who are:

(a)         Breaking speed limits.

(b)         Consuming alcohol or drugs (proprietary and prescribed psychotropic drugs as well as recreational).

(c)         Having inadequate eyesight.

(d)         Having medical conditions such as Alzheimer’s disease.

(e)         Engaging in inappropriate behaviour in the vicinity of cyclists such as breaking Highway Code recommendations with regard to overtaking distances, opening of car doors inattentively, etc.

2.6    Interventions to achieve the reductions which we refer to as desirable should be financed by central Government. Precise amounts can be related to savings in the normal manner, but should also include the costings in terms of health benefits of increased cycling and walking which can occur as a result of increased safety on the road.

1. 3.   “How the decentralisation to local authorities of funding and the setting of priorities will work in practice and contribute towards fulfilling the Government’s vision.”

3.1     We think that the current decentralisation strategy will involve a reduced level of economic activity and – for the reason referred to above (2.1) – will, in that sense, be associated with a decline in overall reported road casualties. It will not, however, be associated with the desirable objective of achieving safety for all by reducing danger at source, and will not increase real road safety.

3.2      The decentralisation strategy will inevitably involve a reduction of spending on attempts to reduce danger on the road by local authorities. We notice that this is already happening with our supporters in various local authorities.

3.3      We are asked to “ensure that … the relatively high risk of accidents amongst some groups, such as cyclists and children from deprived areas, is quickly reduced. The Committee will examine whether the strategic framework will fulfil this vision.” This will not happen with the current decentralisation programme.

1. 4.   “Whether the Government is right to argue that, for the most part, the right legislative framework for road safety is in place, and, in particular, whether the Road Safety Act 2006 has fulfilled its objectives (see Post-Legislative Assessment of the Road Safety Act 2006, Cm 8141, published by the DfT, July 2011)”

4.1      We do not think that the Road Safety Act 2006 can be said to have achieved its objectives.

4.2       We do not believe the correct legislative framework is in place, because:

4.3       The current and likely future decline in levels of policing mean that already inadequate levels of enforcement will be unable to give the required levels for legislation to have a proper effect.

4.4       In order for danger to be properly reduced for cyclists and pedestrians, it will be necessary to have collisions between drivers on the one hand, and pedestrians and cyclists on the other, defined as offences of strict liability for the driver. This should be the case under civil law, and as far as is possible under criminal law.

4.5       It will also be the case that in order for legislation to be effective, adequate forms of evidence gathering, such as with on-board “black-box” type collision recorders will have to be in place.

1. 5.   “Whether the measures set out in the action plan are workable and sufficient”.

5.1      The measures set out in the action plan are in no way sufficient to: “ensure that …  the relatively high risk of accidents amongst some groups, such as cyclists and children from deprived areas, is quickly reduced.”

We are available to expand on any of the above issues to the Committee.

Dr. Robert Davis, Chair, Road Danger Reduction Forum www.rdrf.org.uk  

CONTACT ADDRESS: chairrdrf@aol.com  PO BOX 2944, LONDON NW10 2AX

Vol 17 kicks off in Professor John Whitelegg’s usual welcome mode: ““Sustainable transport in the UK continues its steady decline into the dustbin of a mobility obsessed governmental agenda.” But Vol 17.2 is a classic becasue of the return to Appleyard’s work, a classic remembered by those of us in the 90′s using  his work – literally then one of a kind – in 1981. For us in the RDRF this gives us an important way of addressing  the crucial question of measuring danger. Appleyard’s famous diagrams showing how motor traffic impedes pedestrian movement and community life are revisited here and shown to be relevant as the bases for study in contemporary Britain.

I leave the rest of this post to Professor Whitelegg’s introduction:

“This is an unusual and important issue of the journal. We are delighted to carry an article by Bruce Appleyard in the United Sates which is his introduction to a new edition of Livable Streets.

Livable Streets by Donald Appleyard was published by the University of California Press in 1981 and is one of the most important transport texts to be published in the last 40 years. It immediately identifies the street as an important social milieu and an asset of the greatest importance for  ociability, neighbourliness, friendliness and community life. Donald Appleyard made a huge leap forward leaving the tawdry world of transport economics, costbenefit analysis, highway construction and foolish notions about higher car based mobility feeding higher quality of life well behind. It  establishes a new paradigm and to the shame of most transport professionals and politicians making decisions on transport choices its message is diluted, misunderstood and ignored.

Donald Appleyard’s book opens with the sentence: “Nearly everyone in the world lives on a street”. He goes on to say that the book has two objectives:

§ To explore what it is like to live on streets with different kinds of traffic

 § To search for ways in which more streets can be made safe and livable

 These two objectives capture a great deal of the spirit and purpose of World Transport
Policy and Practice and the revised edition of Livable Streets will be warmly welcomed by everyone
who lives on a street and would like to see life made better by celebrating the quality of those
spaces rather than treating them as sewers for the rapid movement of lumps of metal. This article
is followed by a UK application of the Donald Appleyard methodology. Joshua Hart and Graham Parkhurst report on an original empirical application of “Livable Street” in Bristol and confirm the original findings about the negative impacts of traffic on sociability and conviviality and the need to assert a new transport paradigm that puts streets and human life at the top of the priority list and not somewhere below the level of a car driver speeding through a residential area to visit a gymnasium in order to keep fit. “

..against those who (presumably) think that human beings do not adapt to perceptions of danger. I also draw attention to the hierarchy of danger (the “who kills whom” question) as follows:

John Adams and Ben Hamilton-Baillie (LTT 576) are absolutely correct in
their debunking of Phillip Sulley’s (and the “road safety” establishment’s)
mythology of the supposed benefits of highway engineering with regard to safety
on the road.   My article in LTT’s supplement “Road Safety: Towards 2020?,  (LTT570 06 May – 19 May 2011) states the case against the dominant ideology of road safety more extensively.

Adaptive behaviour by all road users (often referred to as “risk
compensation”) is not just a key explanatory factor for overall changes in road
death numbers, as Adams and Hamilton-Baillie show, but an indicator of crucial
elements in shaping a properly civilised policy on road danger.

It shows how the idiot-proofing of the vehicle (seat belts, roll bars,
crumple zones, air bags etc.) and highway environment (crash barriers, removal
of road side trees etc.) has connived with, if not produced, idiot drivers.

Risk comensation shows, for example, how “road safety” professionals may
consider a section of highway “safe” for pedestrians  when the absence of pedestrian casualties may
be due to an absence of pedestrians – often precisely because of the level of
danger. On a positive note, it shows how road users can adapt to not endanger
others: such as the phenomena of reduced cyclist KSI rates in London since 2000
due to “safety in numbers”, or the beneficial effects of guard railing removal
on pedestrian casualties.

It also prompts questions about what we want as an objective from a
proper approach to road safety. While the study of road deaths at the macro
level across societies gives us the information gathered by Smeed and correctly
commented on by Adams and Hamilton-Baillie, aggregating casualties from all
road users groups does not otherwise tell us anything of real value. It does
not tell us about the chances of people in particular road user groups becoming
a casualty (although thankfully there is at last now some official
consideration of “rate-based” targets for pedestrians and cyclists). It glosses
over the difference in lethality of different groups, ignoring the central
moral question of who kills, hurts or endangers whom.

All of this points to the position taken by groups such as those
representing pedestrians and cyclists, and RoadPeace and the Road Danger
Reduction Forum, namely that the only civilised approach is to aim for safety
for all road users by reducing danger at source – namely from inappropriate use
of motor vehicles – and by making those responsible for it accountable.

Moving in this direction will require a genuinely scientific assessment
of what has happened, including a willingness on the part of practitioners to
accept how they have been part of the problem of danger on the road. Many will
find this difficult: but facing up to this task is what science – and morality
– is about.

Robert Davis; Chair; Road Danger Reduction Forum; LONDON NW10

…the debate continues…

This book, one of the main sources of evidence for the road danger reduction approach, is now out of print.  A few copies are available from the author. Here are what reviewers have said:

“Another book which is so interesting that it makes my head hurt is by Robert Davis… I’ve been reading it for ages. A couple of pages is enough for me to put it down and reflect. It’s chock full of facts and references, as well as thought-provoking observations about the role of the car in our societies.” Mikael Colville-Andersen, Copenhagenize, 2010

 “This book is a compelling assemblage of the evidence for the danger to civilization posed by the continuing unrestricted use of the private car. Written lucidly ‘from the heart’ the documentation is wide-ranging and meticulous.. A book to be warmly recommended” H.S. Eisner, Safety Science 17 [(1994) 227 - 230]

 “If I had sufficient funds, I would give everyone who reads a copy of Death on the Streets. Please do read it and then take up the cudgels with your MP, your District Councillor and your Chief Constable and do not stop until matters are sufficiently improved to enable us all to share our roads in safety” Peter Cannon, British Horse (British Horse Society), [Autumn 1993]

 “Highly recommend as reading for those associated with roads and road safety”. Karl Briggs, New Civil Engineer [12/19 August 1993]

 “A totally brilliant book, which will go down in history as a classic….fully referenced in one invaluable work…. chockful of useful quotes……The issues it raises should dominate our thoughts”. Don Mathew, London Cyclist [April/May 1993]

 “Personally, I shan’t be reading his book.” David Benson, Motoring Editor, Daily Express (6/11/92) Possibly my favourite review, RD.

 “Even if you regard yourself as environmentally aware and safety conscious this book will raise your consciousness still farther….the statistical information is presented in a lively, readable way….His arguments, backed by statistics are very convincing….an excellent antidote to most of the rubbish written on road safety..” CILT Journal (Centre for Independent Transport Research in London) [1,1, April 1993]

“This is a radical critique of road safety policy and practice written with a strong vein of polemic and bound to irritate many readers. Yet I feel it should be read, not just to become familiar with a position which is critical of our own, and relate work, but because there are some good arguments which should be listened to.” Inroads (Journal of the Institute of Road Safety Officers)[15,1, July 1993]

 “This enlightened and detailed book…spares no-one. This book….should be made compulsory reading before one can join the Institute of Road Safety Officers, the judiciary, become a motoring correspondent or even drive a car. If it fails at all it does so only because it is too comprehensive to be read by sceptical road safety professionals and attitude shapers. Highly recommended.” Colin Graham, Cycletouring and Campaigning, April/May 1993.

 “..as powerful as Mick Hamer’s “Wheels Within Wheels”….the way he presents his argumentation and evidence will make many readers change their minds about many things we take for granted. As such, this book should be essential reading for anyone interested or involved in transport safety and environmental issues. Chris Bowers, Going Green (Environmental Transport Association) [Spring 1993]

 “…makes sobering reading for those seriously concerned about road safety….A challenging read..” ‘The Hawk’, Commercial Motor  6 – 12 May 1993.

 “This is a book which does for road safety what Galileo did for astronomy. For pedestrians concerned about the literally deadly threat they face from motor vehicles, it is no exaggeration to say this is probably the most important book ever published on the subject….a devastating book…. Davis seems to have read every book and paper ever published on transport and road safety.. he writes in a lucid but scholarly manner, with all the facts at his fingertips….Death on the Streets is, quite simply brilliant. it amounts to three-hundred pages of stunning argument and authoritative analysis that takes the road safety industry and our car-dominated transport status quo apart. If readers of WALK only ever buy one book on transport, this should be it. Ronald Binns, WALK (Pedestrians Association), Summer 1993.

 “..I would recommend this book to any road safety practitioner, especially to those who believe in engineering as the great cure-all. It is a book which should also be made available to every teacher who covers road safety in his or her classroom.” Richard Doherty,  Care on the Road (RoSPA) August 1993.

 “This is an important book…..I remain both scientifically impressed by the sheer weight of evidence and emotionally swayed by the contrast between adjacent photographs showing children playing in the streets 30 years ago and the barricaded truck routes of today.” Richard Mayou,  The Lancet  Vol 342, July 24 1993, p.226.

‘Death on the Streets; Cars and the mythology of road safety’, by Robert Davis, was published by Leading Edge Press. ISBN 0-948135-46-8. (1993) at £11.99. As it is now out of print and there are only a few rare copies left, I am charging£25 (inc. p&p in the UK ) for private copies (signed if wished). Send cheque made out to Robert Davis at  P.O. Box 2944, NW10 2AX    

The continuing saga of Blackfriars Bridge has revealed a more high profile and combative London Cycling Campaign, preparing a new strategy for the organisation the year before the Mayoral elections. Will this be the way towards getting “the cyclised City”?

Consider LCC CEO Ashok Sinha’s approach as described in London Cyclist June-July 2011 (pp.16 – 18). Having stated that London is indisputably not a cyclised city, and not on a trajectory towards becoming one, how are we to remedy the situation (an issue we have addressed before here , here ,  and here ? The answer for him is “everything”

“Everything means (hold your breath) more money for cycle promotion, more road space for cyclists, lower volumes of motor traffic, slower motorised traffic speeds, more cycle training, safer lorries, more cycle awareness training, for drivers, better wayfinding, more segregated tracks, more mandatory lanes, no one-way streets for cyclists, ending rat-runs, providing ample and secure cycle parking, integrating cycling targets into planning gain, zero-tolerance cycle theft policing, opening up greenways, car-free routes, places and/or times, integrating cycling into public health, air pollution abatement, climate change strategies, and stricter liability for insurance claims purposes. You get the picture”.

Basically, I have four problems with Ashok Sinha’s “everything”.

1. “Everything” becomes “one thing”. Following up from the wish list of “everything”, we get an account of how we might get the political leadership to make this happen. In his article (London Cyclist June-July 2011,pp.16 – 18) he moves on to arguing for  the need for LCC to run “a popular, positive single-issue campaign …If we can target a single totemic issue that, while not a panacea, is big enough to help pave the pathway towards a cyclised city, then we may have traction.”  So now we are on to what is not “everything” – but the single totemic issue, with options such as ”Getting 100,000 children cycling to school regularly”.

 2.      What “everything” actually means. Looking a bit closer you see that it gets a bit more complicated – the peril of a thrown-together shopping list. So, in more detail:

(a)    Infrastructure: the debate about segregation is going again, so what exactly is it that people want? If it is to be fully segregated tracks, then that may be opposed to other kinds of engineering, and raises a host of issues about changes in motorist behaviour at junctions, costs, and how the space necessary is to be removed from parked and moving motor vehicles. If we are to remove road space from motor vehicles, do we want it to be for segregated cycle tracks? Just saying we want more of mandatory cycle lanes, greenways, car-free routes/places/times may raise possibilities but doesn’t provide actual objectives. What would a small amount of road space being re-allocated in one part of London actually mean for cycling on the vast majority of London’s roads?

(b)    Cycle awareness training for drivers. An important area for not just lorry, but all drivers at work. But what proportion of drivers can actually be reached by working through Councils (the main thrust of the LCC campaign on lorry driver training)?

(c)    Secure cycle parking. A desirable aim, but how does this fit in to the almost unrecognised area of home parking?

The problem with a shopping list like this is you can easily end up with some small local improvements at the expense of more important things elsewhere. I suggest we need a whole more than the sum of its parts: but shopping lists can end up with not many parts, let alone a whole that is more than the sum of them.

Also, some key areas of “everything” have been missed out:

3.         Not enough of “everything”.  Elements that have been missed out:

(a)    I refer above to home parking: about half of London’s homes are flats, mainly with inconvenient or insecure cycle parking – and many houses have the same problem. LBs Lambeth and to a lesser extent Hackney, Southwark and Ealing have made attempts to improve this.

(b)    Adequate retail facilities. In large areas of London there are no specialist cycle shops – a necessity for novice cyclists. Government can help retailers through business tax exemptions and/or assistance through apprenticeship schemes. There is an obvious demand for cheap bicycles which can be addressed through recycled, recovered and second-hand bike outlets.

(c)    Support with equipment and accessories, particularly in winter. One of the reasons for the middle class preponderance in cycling is that cycling, particularly with more reliable equipment and clothing, can be expensive. There is also a very distinct reduction in cycling in the winter months which may be alleviated if assistance is given with “winterizing” cycling with support for purchasing wet and cold weather accessories, as carried out to a small extent in LB Ealing’s “Keep Riding in Winter” programme.

(d)    A sea change in law enforcement for careless and dangerous driving. Of value to all road users, and hardly on the agenda.

4.      An overall organising principle.

Road Danger Reduction is essentially about reducing danger at source as part of a sustainable transport policy.  The principle is actually simple. What the LCC is not doing is stating what the problem is.

 For RDRF the problem is: danger from a transport system excessively based on motor vehicle (particularly car, motorcycle, van and lorry) use, with sustainable and more benign modes, particularly cycling, discriminated against.

 The answer is to oppose this through making accountable and reducing the source of danger as part of a more sustainable transport policy. Discrimination is opposed by an equitable approach to the different transport modes. This means equity – fairness – with regard to two basic elements: resource allocation and danger. Instead of “everything” we have the simple response of equity, or fairness.

 The merit of the fairness approach is that it is simple and based on the idea that we are not asking for anything special, just an equal deal without discrimination against cycling. It is based on an idea of natural justice which is morally difficult to oppose.

 Of course, it will be opposed because the motoring lobby sees itself as oppressed. That is an ideological battle which will have to be joined. Let’s look at the two basic elements we need to consider.

Resource allocation.

Essentially every transport user both pays for their mode of transport (in fares, purchasing vehicle, VAT etc.) and also inflicts costs on society through use of the transport mode of choice. This is a hotly contested matter, not least because of inevitable argument about how to calculate the costs of, for example, pollution – and whether we should do so in the first place. In fact monetary forms of calculation are traditionally used in cost-benefit analyses which tend to reinforce the transport status quo.

Nevertheless, we can argue that private motoring has net costs to society and the environment even after all the various forms of motorist taxation are paid – and that there is a good case for requiring motorists to pay more, primarily through increased costs of fuel. http://rdrf.org.uk/2011/01/266/  But even without discussing car and road freight costs, we have to remember the subsidy to public transport.

While Mayor Johnson has been cutting TfL’s expenditure, subsidy for public transport is still far higher than spend on cycling. Roughly speaking, a typical bus passenger gets at least 80p per trip, or some £350 per commuting year, subsidy. Tube and rail passengers get more, and that’s without the extremely expensive (£15+ billion) Crossrail scheme.

By comparison, without the Bike Hire and  Cycle Super Highway (CSH) schemes, undefined TfL spend on cycling is supposedly about £20 million annually (it is unclear whether this includes Borough LIP spending on items such as schools cycle training)

If cycling were to get more or less the same amount of subsidy as bus transport, we could expect a ring fenced amount approaching £100 million per annum. (£350 x 275,000, the number of cyclists daily). That is for a mode which is generally far healthier and environmentally benign, as well as being more convenient in outer London. Cycling England (the now abolished advisory body to Government) gave a figure of a £10,000 (over a lifetime) as the benefit of an extra regular cyclist.

In addition, where highway infrastructure is the target for expenditure, one can argue that costs should be borne out of general highways budgets.

And still £100 million annually would be a very small part of even a much reduced TfL annual budget – some 1% of the 2009/2010 budget of £9.2 billion.

Before getting too bored with figures, it is worthwhile reminding ourselves that – before he got to power – Ken Livingstone’s advice to cycling campaigners was to aim for more than 1% of the transport budget. Under his regime it never got to half of that – and then mainly for the “LCN+”. And then there is the additional massive subsidy over-60s get with public transport – what about free bikes for over-60s?

What would equitable resource allocation actually mean?

Above I have tried to show that it makes sense in terms of equity for cyclists to expect a substantial tranche of ring-fenced funding of some £100 million per annum.  This represents a tiny proportion of the existing TfL budget which – whatever the climate of economic austerity – could be diverted from the massive general budget with minimal detrimental effect to other modes. All of this is without comparison with, for example, the Dutch model of 25 Euros per head of the population annually for investment in cycling, or some £170 million in the London context.

Where would it go?  A range of areas of support are mentioned above:

• Support with subsidised equipment, wet and cold weather clothing and other necessary accessories to individual cyclists.
• Support for cycling retailers and second hand / recovered bikes schemes.
• Subsidised home parking; on-road confidence and maintenance skills training.
• Anti-cycle theft programmes including secure parking at workplaces and in public places.

The idea is to actually assist people who want to cycle by dealing with obstacles that will occur whatever kind of danger there is on the road or whatever kind of infrastructure exists. Programmes like LB Ealing’s Direct Support for Cycling make a minimal effort to achieve this. The loss of cycling culture means that a variety of groups, such as women in black and ethnic minority communities is particularly distanced from cycling and can benefit from specific support.

This equitable resource allocation could include the financing of necessary highway and off-road infrastructure and policing- although these should arguably be financed out of general budgets.

Danger

The RDR approach is to address the reduction of danger at source for the safety of all road users, by making those responsible for that danger accountable. That can mean real accountability for whoever is considered responsibility for danger from motor traffic – highway authorities, vehicle engineers or individual motorists. It ranges from the volume and flows of motor traffic to specific vehicle manoeuvres and ways of reducing them by whatever means are necessary.

The approach has to be based on the fact that the kind of rule and law infractions by motorists implicated in endangering other road users are commonplace, and that current levels of law enforcement do not even scratch the surface of the iceberg of motorised rule and law breaking. Furthermore, the idiot-proofing of the road and car environment by “road safety” professionals has exacerbated the danger posed by the motorised to other road users.

The shopping list of danger reduction initiatives normally wheeled out (enforcing existing speed limits, more 20 mph areas or zones; higher levels of police enforcement, pressure on national government to reduce lenient sentencing, specific HGV measures etc.) has  to be looked at through this perspective.

What this means is that we become aware that the initiatives will not only have minimal impact, but that they may occur in an environment with danger increasing elsewhere. RDR also suggests that pressing down on road danger in one area leads to it appearing elsewhere: it is crucial to keep the overall picture in mind and not allocate all the effort in a few specific areas. Urban cyclists know that there are a number of potential manoeuvres by motorists which can lead to collision with cyclists (or pedestrians), and there is little – if any – advantage in concentrating on just one or two.

Some reminders on road danger

• Speak English, not “roadsafetyese”. Very often all you have to do is invert the speech to get the real road safety meaning. For example, more crashworthy cars which encourage less careful driving are not “safer”, but more dangerous. A “safe road” which has few reported casualties may be one where there is a lot of motor danger which reduces pedestrian and cyclist traffic. Check up on these basics when engaging with the official “road safety” paradigm presented in local and central government. Always remember the “who kills – or just endangers – whom?” question.
• Safety on the road is above all a moral and political question involving a pronounced hierarchy of danger. Inevitable attention to cyclist (or occasionally pedestrian) rule/law breaking can create the space to draw attention to the more important kinds of danger which tend to evade media and public consciousness.
• The aim of real road safety is reducing danger at source (e.g. primarily from motorised traffic) and holding those responsible for it accountable. The numbers of people reported as injured is another issue – even the better indicator of casualty rates (per journey or distance travelled) is less important than reducing danger and holding those responsible for it accountable.
• Always remember that people adapt to perceived danger. This can be in both the short and long term, with cultural change accepting practices previously thought unacceptable. The strategy is to get adaptation so that danger is reduced at source.

Raising the real road safety agenda

The kind of measures we could have for real road safety are not on the agenda yet – although they could be – and discussion needs to involve suggesting what we might require if we are to have safe roads for all:

• Call for black box recorders for motor vehicles to establish cause for post-crash criminal and civil law investigation.
• Call for a shift to driver liability for collisions involving cyclists or pedestrians for both civil and criminal law – based on (a) the fact of the “iceberg” of motorists rule and law breaking (b) the assumptions by “road safety” professionals of the inherent danger posed by the motorised and (c) the insurance industry actuarial estimates of danger from motorists compared to cyclists or pedestrians.
• Consideration of technologies (pedestrian activated motor vehicle braking systems, citizen road user camera users, on-board speed governors etc.) not so much for actual implementation, but for raising the issues of RDR.
• Use targets and indices should not just be the “rate-based” (casualties per journey or distance travelled), but should move on to rates assessing whether a third party is at fault. Indices relating to perception of safety can also be used.
• Give proper evidence-based information on supposed “safety” initiatives such as helmet and hi-viz advocacy

These are the thoughts of someone who has been cycling in London for 35 years and a member of LCC for most of them. Your comments to chairrdrf@aol.com will be considered.

Hi-viz to walk to school in Hounslow, West London

ABOVE: West London car retailers cargiant have sponsored children wearing hi-viz to walk to school.   

A couple of bloggers have recently raised the issue of “road safety” professionals pushing hi-viz wear and devices for pedestrians as well as cyclists. The politics of the conspicuity con is dealt with in Chapter 9 of my “Death on the Streets: cars and the mythology of road safety” (1992). Here I discuss how this kind of “road safety” initiative is not just without an evidence base, but actually becomes part of the problem it is supposed to deal with. the reference to “slutwalks” should become clear.Mikael Colville-Andersen gives an interesting account of how  “road safety” personnel push hi-viz in his son’s school. Mikael rightly reports the lack of evidence to show actual beneficial changes in casualty rates as a result of this kind of programme. There is one rather ropey Norwegian study referred to, but even the UK Department of Transport has indicated that there is a lack of evidence to justify hi-viz for cyclists. Mikael states – correctly – that people genuinely concerned with safety on the road should eal with what he calls “the bull in the china shop”, namely danger from motorised traffic, which they don’t.   

But it is worse than that. I would argue that a key reason why motorists feel they can get away with justifying bad driving is the “Sorry Mate I Didn’t See You” (SMIDSY) excuse. (See the CTC’s campaign against SMIDSY).And this excuse is facilitated by precisely the kind of campaigns which put the onus of responsibility to “Be Seen” on the least dangerous to others, rather than requiring those who are dangerous to others to watch out for their potential victims.   

The most basic rule of safe driving, in the Highway Code and elsewhere, is to “Never drive in such a way that you can not stop within visible distance“. But this is eroded, not just by failure to have proper speed limits and their compliance, but by the assumption that if motorists don’t “see” their victims, it is the victim’s fault. Whether by lengthening sight lines or other measures, the underlying belief system thrusts the onus of risk on to motorists actual or potential victims. It is not just a lack of speed control, or the failure to weed out motorists who can’t see where they are going. It is a general culture – promoted by the “road safety” lobby – that you don’t have to fulfil a responsibility to properly watch out for those you may hurt or kill.   

I emphasise “watching out for” because what is required is a thorough process where drivers consider the possible positions of those they may drive into, think about their need to avoid doing so, and drive accordingly. The image of a pedestrian or cyclist on the retina of the driver is just the first part of this process. And the key element is searching – watching out or looking out – for these people in the first place. It is an active process which is far more effective than any amount of hi-viz, which may be irrelevant anyway. I am regularly told by motorists that they see plenty of cyclists without lights at night. Indeed: if they are driving properly (albeit in an urban area with street lighting) they will indeed see unlit cyclists.   

Let me be quite clear about this. My argument is not just that this is rather unsavoury victim-blaming and morally objectionable. It is that it exacerbates the very problem it claims to address. In ten years or so these young people may become drivers with the expectation that others should shoulder the responsibility that they as drivers have. The official “road safety” response to this criticism is – to avoid it. The typical answer is that :”Of course, motorists should watch where they are going, and we may have an advertising campaign to politely ask them to do so, but in the meantime wear hi-viz“.  The problem with this is twofold: firstly, this “in the meantime” has been going on for over a century of motorists endangering, hurting and killing others, and that polite requests aren’t going to do it. But the second point is the more important: the relentless shifting of responsibility away from those endangering others becomes part of the problem.   

“Take it to Make It”   

The second post that sparked a desire to comment on the conspicuity con is here. Do note the slogan: If you don’t take it, you may not make it. And guess whose fault that’s going to be?   

Slutwalks   

This year Guardian readers and others have been debating the Slutwalk phenomenon. I won’t go into these debates here (personally, I don’t quite see how a word like “slut” can be “reclaimed”) except to note two key messages that Slutwalk supporters have been making. These are that:   

1. There is no evidence to link the nature of a woman’s clothes with the chances of being assaulted.   

2. Insofar as there is any connection between women’s clothing and the excuses made by rapists it is just that: excuses. Furthermore, if a belief system contains the idea that womens’ clothing is a key factor in generating rape, then that belief facilitates rape, is dangerous, and suggests that the belief system needs some critical evaluation.   

Is there some conection between ideas around women’s clothing as a factor invovled in sexual assault and those around hi-viz and pedestrians and cyclists being knocked down?   

Now, I’m not suggesting that you should never wear bright clothing when cycling. Nor  - of course – that carelessly knocking a pedestrian down with a car is the same as sexual assuault. An analogy is just that – an analogy, which I hope stimulates productive thought.  

I’m pleased to report that Local Transport Today, the fortnightly journal for transport practitioners, has given us a significant outlet for publicising Road Danger Reduction (RDR) in it’s special supplement “Road Safety: Towards 2020″, out now (LTT570 06 May – 19 May 2011). Below I reproduce the published article of your Chair’s description of RDR- and how it differs from the rest of the contributions in the supplement. The supplement also includes a piece by Norma Fender, the UK’s first Road Danger Reduction Officer, on RDR work at LB Lambeth. Thanks LTT!Road danger reduction

Safer roads: but who for?

MOST CURRENT ROAD SAFETY MEASURES PAY INSUFFICIENT ACCOUNT OF THE MORAL ISSUES ASOCIATED WITH WHO CAUSES ROAD TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS, ARGUES ROAD DANGER REDUCTION FORUM CHAIR, ROBERT DAVIS

Some members of the “road safety” community sometimes align themselves with approaches to reduce danger on the road at source – basically from inappropriate use of motor vehicles. But in various ways the establishment of “road safety” professionals – highway engineers, Road Safety Officers, myriad legal, medical and other professionals – and the ideology they espouse, is very much part of the problem of danger on the road.

Hence the need for the use of inverted commas to describe “road safety”, made because a  civilised approach to danger on the road – road danger reduction (RDR), or “real road safety” – is opposed to  official “road safety” (RS), which

1. Fails to address, let alone deal with, the problem of danger on the road – particularly for cyclists and pedestrians. Compared to the standards of safety required (albeit it in what we may consider to be an excessively risk averse culture) in maritime, aviation, rail and workplace safety regimes, motorised road users have their danger relatively unchecked.
2. Frequently exacerbates danger on the road. The history of idiot-proofing the highway and car environment has indeed generated less care, alertness and vigilance on the part of the motorised, if not idiocy.
3. Pursues victim-blaming of the more vulnerable – and less dangerous to others – road users, as part of an attempt to gloss over the difference between endangering others and being endangered.

All of this is backed up by a pseudo-scientific justification of RS initiatives, clothed in “objective” language, particularly with regard to the confusion between transitive and intransitive meanings of “dangerous”.

Now you know why I don’t get too many invitations to “road safety” conferences.

But RDR does have the support of the main road user groups concerned with the well-being of cyclists and pedestrians (LCC, CTC, Living Streets), 20s Plenty for Us, and the national road crash victims charity, RoadPeace. The Road Danger Reduction Charter has been signed by a number of local authorities.

The RDR programme is backed up by natural justice and common sense. It pushes for more fundamental methods of reducing danger on the road (and making those responsible for it accountable) than the RS lobby. By reducing danger at source we can achieve “Safer Roads for All”. It argues that one of the reasons for the limited success and sometimes beleaguered status of RS initiatives is precisely the history of RS interventions, based on the understanding of how people adapt to changes in perception of risk.

Compensation claims

We all tend to change our behaviour when we feel there is a hazard or threat to avoid it, and we relax or become less vigilant and alert when we feel there is less of a threat.

Central to any version of RC (Risk Compensation – RD) theory, whether in the work of John Adams, Gerard Wilde, or the practice of Hans Monderman and others, is that safety benefits tend to be absorbed as performance benefits. Most academics will accept this: the RS lobby, however, does not – it challenges too many of their claims.

The legendary RS academic Reuben Smeed described the relationship between motorisation and the rate of deaths per motor vehicle in a country. His law demonstrated that large decreases in deaths per motor vehicle could be found in almost all countries as their levels of motorization increased. Smeed put this down to increases in car crashworthiness: more efficient brakes and suspension, padded dashboards, collapsible steering wheels, safety cages, crumple zones, air bags etc.

But Adams, re-working Smeed’s figures and showing how versions of the law remain usefully predictive, shows how this applies irrespective of the kind of car on the roads.

In fact, Adams argues that the declines in deaths can be considered as due to behavioural adaptation by road users as the volume of road traffic increases. Smeed referred to examples of children staying indoors as television ownership became more widespread as an explanation for child pedestrian casualties declining, and admitted that: “in some circumstances – behaviour is affected by the amounts of traffic on the roads”.

Also, factoring in the change in concentration on the part of a motorist in more congested road conditions, we can see that this increased crashworthiness has only been at best part of the reason for declining chances of being killed as a car occupant. Increased awareness of the chances of surviving crashes intact has had a detrimental effect on driver behaviour.

Highway engineers argue that reductions in deaths over time are due to their efforts.  Cutting down roadside trees; installing crash barriers; lengthening sight lines; surrounding bridge supports and other infrastructure with impact-attenuating devices: all are described as the reason for reductions in deaths.

Yet the same objections to these explanations apply as to vehicle design: adaptation by motorists, and understanding of accident migration and regression-to-mean, suggest in most cases that the claims made for engineering measures are overstated.

Far from there being a history of progress, we can see that declines in road deaths may be due to:

• Spontaneous change in road user behaviour. Either or both the “social learning” theory or those focussing on small scale interactions, will come up with the same conclusion: people adapt to the increase on motor vehicle traffic throughout society, and this accounts for the changes Smeed observed. Not surprisingly, RS professionals do not want to think that changes have occurred irrespective of their interventions.

• Withdrawal of the benign modes from the road environment. The most extreme form of behaviour change involving adaptation to danger is  removal of cyclist and pedestrians, particularly children prohibited from independent travel by their parents, out of the road environment altogether. Although this occurs for other reasons as well as adaptation to road danger, it is an explanation for supposed “progress” in “road safety”.
• Increasing sophistication of post-collision medical care. possibly responsible for a reduction of nearly a half of the total road crash deaths since pre-war times due to better trauma care and treatment by emergency services.

But need it be like this? What alternative could we expect and promote?

There is plenty of evidence to suggest that when the “safety measure” of pedestrian guard railing is removed, casualties decline: motorists adapt to pedestrians crossing more randomly in a way that – unlike most adaptations mentioned above – reduces motor danger.

Another case is cycling in London since 2000, where the last decade has seen the KSI rate (KSIs per cyclist distance travelled) cut by more than half. There has been limited change in relevant highway infrastructure, so this change has to be attributed to increased awareness of cyclists forced upon motorists by the significant increase in cycling. This is referred to as an example of “Critical Mass” or “Safety in Numbers” (SiN), essentially variants of the work done by earlier RC theorists. There is also a similar link between low levels of cycling and higher casualty rates between boroughs.

These examples show how Risk Compensation is not “just negative” (although it always casts aspersions on the claims of RS professionals), but shows ways forward. Of course, many RC professionals do not see the London cyclists example as particularly good because they are not concerned with cyclist casualties per journey or distance travelled – what has become called the “casualty rate”.

This raises the fundamental issue:
What kind of performance indicator of success is appropriate? What is it that we actually want?

The wrong data?

The data used by Smeed and Adams tell us about what has happened on the roads (although not as Smeed intended). But apart from this casualty statistics are rubbish – at best irrelevant and at worst misleading. Let’s draw breath and see why:

A primary rule of statistics is that all units should have equal status – like has to be compared with like. But RS statistics do not do that. The consequences of quite different kinds of incident are lumped together as if there was no difference between them. The fundamental issue of “who kills whom” is frozen out of the discourse.

When news items refer to the UK’s “road safety record”, no difference between the experiences of the various types of road user is made. So, for example, about a quarter of all the deaths on the road are of motorcyclists who only account for some 2% of journeys. They obviously have a far higher chance of being killed than a car occupant, who in turn has quite different chances of being killed if they are making urban as opposed to non-built up road journeys, if they are young or middle-aged etc.

More importantly, the figures do not tell you anything about responsibility. Have the dead motorcyclists been killed by motorists engaged in behaviour which threatened any road user at the location of the incident involved, or were they killed by their own rule or law breaking?

This not just a non-scientific approach, it is fundamentally immoral: by neutering the political issue of who kills whom RS is inevitably going to discriminate against the more vulnerable and the less dangerous to others.

So what would a good performance indicator for real road safety be? We are not just interested in what the (retrospectively calculated) chances of being hurt or killed are. We are interested in the chances of particular incidents occurring, and the kind of conditions they occur in. Even then this would only be a rough guide to the measures we want taken: ultimately we cannot live in a risk-free environment, but we can make those responsible for danger accountable, whether they be individual motorists, vehicle manufacturers or highway engineers.

At the very least we have to understand that low casualty numbers do not indicate that a highway environment has low levels of danger – it might be quite the opposite.

Finally, for those who feel entranced by numbers when confronted with the aggregated number of “Road Traffic Accident” deaths:

• This number – as a proportion of all deaths in the UK – is actually quite small (less than 0.5%) – hardly a good lever for real road safety interventions.
• This number is far smaller than those killed by adding up those from:

(a)  Poor health associated with car-based lifestyles. (A cycling modal share of the German (let alone Dutch or Danish) level would result in some 2 – 4,000 fewer lives lost per annum in the UK as a consequence of the health benefits of cycling alone).

(b)  Deaths from noxious emissions.

(c)  Deaths from resources being spent on road building etc. that could be spent on health care.

(d)  The deaths and poor health due to climate change created by motor vehicle emissions.

The road ahead

RDR is fundamentally different from RS. However, practitioners and campaigners can pursue RDR in ways similar to RS – such as speed reduction, increased law enforcement with deterrent sentencing for those significantly endangering others, rate-based targets etc. Since the RS industry has connived with careless and dangerous driving through its practice of providing “more forgiving” road and car environments for motorists assumed to be bent on rule- and law-breaking, the least it can do is demand proper driver liability in collisions involving cyclists or pedestrians.

The point of this article is to provide the alternative perspective with which practitioners should view interventions: what will be the short- and long-term effects when inevitable adaptation occurs? Will cyclist or driver training, shared space, separated cycle tracks or whatever actually reduce danger at source – and how will that be measured? Will practitioners continue to be implicated in the far larger numbers of life years lost from motor traffic than in RTAs? What are the objectives of that branch of transport policy concerned with safety in a civilised society?

 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 

 Road danger reduction: the basics

• Speak English, not “roadsafetyese”. Very often all you have to do is invert the speech to get the real road safety meaning. For example, more crashworthy cars which encourage less careful driving are not “safer”, but more dangerous. A “safe road” which has few reported casualties may be one where there is a lot of motor danger which reduces pedestrian and cyclist traffic.
• Always remember the “who kills – or just endangers – whom?” question.
•  Safety on the road is above all a moral and political question involving a pronounced hierarchy of danger.
• The aim of real road safety is reducing danger at source (e.g. primarily from motorised traffic) and holding those responsible for it accountable. The numbers of people reported as injured is another issue – even the better indicator of casualty rates (per journey or distance travelled) is less important than reducing danger and holding those responsible for it accountable.
• Always remember that people adapt to perceived danger. This can be in both the short and long term, with cultural change accepting practices previously thought unacceptable. The strategy is to get adaptation so that danger is reduced at source.
• Safety on the road is ultimately about which groups of road users are allowed to do what to whom. A sustainable transport policy means reducing motorist hegemony: at the very least it means questioning it – something which is firmly resisted by the RS lobby.

AND :

Embedding road danger reduction in Lambeths LTP

ROAD DANGER REDUCTION PRINCIPLES HAVE BEEN EMBRACED BY THE LONDON BOROUGH OF LAMBETH, EXPLAINS THE COUNCIL’S ROAD DANGER REDUCTION MANAGER, NORMA FENDER

 The decision to adopt a Road Danger Reduction (RDR) approach to transport policy was championed by Councillor Nigel Haselden, currently Cabinet Member for Regeneration, Planning and Strategic Transport at Lambeth Council.  The council signed the Road Danger Reduction Charter and became the first local authority to appoint an RDR manager.

 In the ten years to the end of 2010, Lambeth succeeded in meeting its statutory casualty reduction targets, achieving a substantial reduction in the number of pedestrians and children being injured.   However, despite engineering improvements such as the introduction of 20mph zones, coupled with road safety campaigns, the council was aware of the remaining underlying perception, especially among those outside cars (i.e. pedestrians, cyclists and motorcyclists) that the risk of them being injured on the road was not diminishing despite the reduction in casualty numbers.  Drivers on the other hand were likely to have a perception that the roads were becoming safer as the developments in safety systems within cars (seat belts, advanced braking systems, airbags) improved and reduced the likelihood of crashing and the severity of possible injuries for those inside vehicles.  This meant that there was a growing imbalance in the perception of safety of those inside and those outside cars or other enclosed motorised vehicles.

 It also became apparent that the prevailing approach to road safety engineering, based on interventions at sites where there is a cluster of collisions, was a finite one.  Over time all sites which could be improved by engineering interventions would have been improved and the remaining “black-spots” would not be able to be improved by physical measures alone.  Casualties would become more scattered around the borough and reductions in casualties ever more difficult to achieve.

 Lambeth therefore decided to use the principles of road danger reduction as the basis of its new transport strategy.

 Lambeth’s Road Safety Plan 2005-2011 cited many of the principles of RDR in its aims, and indeed, many aspects of Lambeth’s Road Safety Strategy have for several years been in tune with an RDR approach: i.e. recognising the need to reduce danger at source by reducing vehicle speeds through 20mph zones and engineering changes to the environment and promoting modal shift from private motorised vehicles (i.e. cars and motorbikes) to less threatening, and more sustainable modes.  The earlier Plan also recognised that reducing the fear and intimidation that more vulnerable road users felt was paramount in order to bring about social inclusion and improve quality of life.

 The draft RDR Strategy outlines principles which have been embedded in the new Lambeth Transport Plan (LTP) and provides the overarching vision which the LTP aims to achieve.  The two documents complement each other and are designed to be read together.

 The key objectives of Lambeth’s new Transport Plan put RDR at its heart.  One objective explicitly espouses RDR with the aim of “Reducing the real and perceived danger on Lambeth’s roads”, recognising the importance of measuring whether people perceive that the level of danger on the roads has reduced. The other key objectives also follow RDR principles:  promote sustainable healthy travel behaviour; improve air quality and reduce CO2 emissions; improve the condition of principal roads.

 Lambeth puts renewed emphasis on its road user hierarchy in its new RDR strategy and LTP to ensure that the least polluting, least threatening and most active forms of travel are always prioritised.  This means that no new schemes or activities should adversely affect a group of road users placed higher in the road user hierarchy.

 * Walking (including mobility impaired persons)

*  Cycling

• Buses
• Taxis and minicabs
• Motorcycles/scooters
• Freight Transport
• Private Cars

 One of the most challenging aspects of RDR is to find new ways of measuring the increase or decrease of danger on the roads. 

 Lambeth is planning to add the following measures to the statutory measure of casualty figures:

 Reduction in vehicle speeds

• Reduction in number of motorised vehicles
• Increase in numbers of people walking and cycling
• Decrease in dangerous driver behaviour (e.g. mobile phone use)
• Perception surveys among pedestrians and cyclists as to whether roads feel more or less dangerous.

 The council is looking at new ways to prioritise engineering schemes, perhaps giving a higher weighting to locations where cyclists and pedestrians have been injured rather than the occupants of motorised vehicles.  Deprivation levels will also be looked at when prioritising schemes.

 In order to strongly embed RDR principles in all strands of transport policy, road safety engineering, parking implementation, sustainable transport and road safety education training and publicity teams will join together with strategic planning to form one Transportation Team. 

 The Transportation Team will use a “Better Neighbourhoods” approach as a means of delivering its RDR strategy.  When delivering future local safety schemes, 20mph zones and controlled parking zones, Lambeth will complement engineering works with a range of softer measures such as cycle facilities and training, travel awareness and road safety campaigns.  Maintenance work will also be used as an opportunity to introduce complementary RDR measures.

  Road safety officers will work closely with sustainable transport officers, promoting modal shift to walking and cycling and providing practical training to equip road users (especially younger ones) with the skills to become confident pedestrians and cyclists.  Road safety campaigns, education and training will focus primarily on targeting sources of the greatest danger (the drivers of motorised vehicles) and aim to encourage people to choose less polluting, less threatening modes of transport as well as educating drivers and motorcyclists to become more aware of the needs of people outside cars.  Lambeth will also aim to work closely with the police as enforcement is a key part of reducing road danger.

• Using a hand held mobile phone
• Not wearing a seatbelt
• “If you feel the vehicle is travelling too fast”
• Turning at the junction without using a direction indicator
• A broken brake light
• Jumping a red signal.

A bit of monitoring of anti-social illegal driving may well be a good idea. It may be churlish to point out that one of the prizes given to participants is a thrilling ride in a Ferrari (the “Virgin Ferrari Thrill Experience”).

 As the CTC say:

” CTC and the AA may not agree on everything, but the latter’s idea for a survey by volunteers to monitor levels of bad driving on local junctions is a good one. CTC hopes the results may help the AA to realise that the biggest threat on the roads comes from illegal and dangerous driving: 48% of cars were observed to be breaking the 30 mph speed limit last year”

But let’s look a little more closely.

 As the CTC point out, we know already from “Road Statistics 2008: Traffic, Speeds and Congestion”  about the scale of law breaking involving speed. 49% of cars exceeded the 30 mph limit in free-flowing conditions in 2008, with 18% breaking 35mph. This was better than 10 years earlier, but still indicates that a substantial proportion of drivers engage in illegal behaviour,  endangering other road users with virtual impunity. There is minimal control of speeds, with well-advertised controls at selected sites where what is judged to be the appropriate number of people have been reported as hurt or killed, and even less control through mobile cameras. That lack of control and social acceptance associated with it is why that substantial proportion of motorists speed in the first place – they know they can get away with it.

 There is no mystery here – so why is the AA asking volunteers to survey it? The evidence exists – and more is being added with Highway Authorities carrying out further regular surveys on speed. On top of this, the question asks the surveyor if they feel the vehicle is travelling too fast.  So, if you are one of those in nearly half the driving population who regularly break the law here, maybe you won’t feel the law-breakers are actually speeding.

 Seat belts? We’d better not go into the effects of seat belt wearing on other road users… Suffice it to say that not wearing a seat belt doesn’t pose the threat to other road users that other items in this survey do.

 And these are fairly obvious: using a mobile phone, jumping lights, turning without indicators – but we already have evidence of these behaviours. What grates is that these are part of the easily observable iceberg tips of inappropriate, or careless, or plain dangerous driving.

 One could go into the less easily observable – but known about – iceberg tip of bad driving: under the influence of alcohol or drugs (whether recreational, prescription or proprietary);  driving when drowsy; without being able to see properly; with psychological conditions such as Alzheimer’s; when banned; or when unregistered.

 We know that there are millions of drivers engaged in these iceberg tips of bad driving (that’s not including speeding), whether observable or not. Is the AA suggesting any real action here? I would say not: the AA has a history of proudly defending the “right” of its members to speed, and even where it suggests that there are behaviours which are wrong, will it lobby hard for the appropriate levels of enforcement and deterrent sentencing to stop them? I think not – that would inconvenience their members and lead to banning not a few of them.

 Which then brings us down to the bulk of the iceberg: the breaking of the Highway Code which leads to the vast majority of collisions on the road. We suggest you take a look at the relevant sections of the Highway Code for AA members and other drivers.   There really is quite a lot there which is disregarded as a matter of course by AA (and RAC, of course) members and other drivers.

Apart from the occasional polite request to motorists to try to behave properly, is the AA an organisation which will ever push for any real controls of these behaviours? Anything remotely radical, such as driver liability in collisions involving pedestrians or cyclists, has been fervently opposed by them.

 In effect drivers remain unaccountable for the danger they pose to others, and the AA, aided by the odd bit of road safetywash, is part of this problem.

It’s nice to see there were justifiably indignant responses to the AAs dreadful stunt recently. It’s worthwhile to see who reacted and how – and who didn’t.

• The CTC got a nice polite response in, with a useful counter-stunt reminding motorists of their obligations (see photo above).
•  One of my favourite responses were the people who took the lids and sold them on E-bay, and explained why they did so. 
•  Velorution got in on the analogy game with a rival to mine: “This is like Qadhafi giving bullet-proof vests to the citizens of Misrata and then showering them with cluster bombs.”
• Cycling Weekly, traditionally the club cyclists’ magazine and with a strong motorist readership, had a very good editorial which I reproduce in full below:

 It’s not AA-OK: motoring publicity stunt doesn’t benefit bikers

 ”The AA giving out 5,000 free helmets to London cyclists is another example of an organisation missing the point when it comes to road safety. The motoring organisation’s misguided gimmick sends the message that cycling is dangerous and the onus is on cyclists to protect themselves, rather than on drivers not to endanger cyclists.

 Let me be clear, I’m not anti-helmet. I wear one when I’m riding and agree that when you’re racing/competing or riding off-road you really should wear one. But here’s the thing, when you’re simply riding your bike around, there is no need to wear one.

 It’s very rare that people fall off bikes. It’s rarer still for them to hit their heads when they do. So why does someone riding round London need to wear a helmet? The answer for most is in case they get hit by a car, and there’s two major issues with this.

 Firstly, if the answer to the problems of cyclists being hit by cars is to make cyclists wear helmets we are living in a messed up world. Secondly, helmets do very little to protect cyclists who get hit by a car.

The situation we need to get to is one like in the Netherlands, where hundreds of thousands of cyclists ride around without any threat to their safety, drivers look out for cyclists and helmet use is barely a consideration.

 Stunts like this one by the AA chip away at both the perception of cycling and the responsibility of drivers.

And to think they’re sponsoring this year’s Tour of Britain as well.” Simon Richardson, Deputy Editor, Cycling Weekly Thursday April 28^th 2011.

 There are some minor criticisms: benefits of helmets are questionable even in the circumstances referred to, and there is a possible association with helmet wearing and more careless cycling associated when off-roading and cycle racing.  And it’s millions, not hundreds of thousands, of cyclists in the Netherlands. But these are minor points,

 Then there are those who didn’t manage to complain. The London Cycling Campaign didn’t react, presumably because of inadequate resources rather than approval. Cyclenation (the Cycle Campaign Network) just reported the stunt.

 So let’s remind ourselves of what was so offensive about the stunt. This is the role of the AA (and the other main motorist organisation, the RAC) in – at best – failing to acknowledge the danger posed by motorised transport to all other road users. Of course, dealing with this danger would inconvenience many of it’s members, not to mention banning many of them from driving in the first place, so it is only to be expected.

 Nevertheless, we should constantly point out that these organisations are implicated in massive irresponsibility in failing to address danger on the roads, or even conniving with it. Of course, much of this is simply an echo of what the official “road safety” establishment is up to. Not least is the refusal to ask “Who kills – or hurts or endangers – whom?” which characterises so much of “road safety”. This glossing over of the difference in potential to hurt or kill between different types of road users is typical of “road safety” – the AA/RAC are just an extreme example.

 So when AA President Edmund King opposed measures for driver liability, saying “Simple changes in the law that assume one party is in the wrong because of what they drive will not help harmony on the roads.”  He was not just refusing to recognise the difference in potential – and actual lethality – of the different modes, he was echoing the official ideology of “road safety”. By the way, Mr King, I don’t drive my bicycle or my feet when I’m walking…

In the last post we mentioned how the AA had an official policy of interfering with police attempts to make motorists drive legally. Here are a couple of other examples:

1. Misinformation on 20 miles per hour
2. In 2004 in London the police caved in over enforcing speed limits with the 665 fixed cameras in place only 260 were to be loaded with film and in a second retreat, the number of sites at which mobile speed cameras were to be used by police cut from 127 to about 25. The move was welcomed by Edmund King (then executive director of the RAC Foundation as “…an enlightened and pragmatic approach to road safety”.

More on the AA and its road safetywash in the next post.